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In the early morning hours of March 24, 1989, the supertanker ​Exxon Valdez​ ran aground 
on Alaska’s Bligh Reef, gashing a hole in the supertanker that eventually dumped 10.8 million 
gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound.  The ​Exxon Valdez ​was carrying 53 million 
gallons of oil drilled from the fields of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, in the North Slope Borough.  The 
oil had been moved to the port city of Valdez via the decade old Trans-Alaska Pipeline, which 
spans 800 miles north to south and was en route to Long Beach, California.  The spill was the 
largest oil spill in American history until the 2010 ​Deepwater Horizon ​spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico.  The massive ​Exxon Valdez​ was just over two years old at the time of the spill, coming 
in at a whopping 301 meters long, 51 meters wide, and 26 meters deep with the ability to 
transport more than 62 million gallons of oil at a time. 
The ​Exxon Valdez ​oil spill was preceded by centuries of industrialization and quests for 
the cheapest sources of energy available.  To understand the history of oil and the world’s fight 
to get their hands on it, reference Daniel Yergin’s ​The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & 
Power​.  For a scientific and economic perspective on the ​Exxon Valdez ​oil spill, John Keeble’s 
Out of the Channel: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Sound ​is a truly indispensable 
 
 3 
resource, and for a more personal look at the disaster one would be remiss to not consult Angela 
Day’s ​Red Light to Starboard: Recalling the Exxon Valdez Disaster​.  Art Davidson provides a 
thorough look at the spill in ​his book, ​In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez: The Devastating Impact 
of the Alaska Oil Spill​.  For more personal accounts of the spill, reference Stan Jones’ ​The Spill: 
Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster​ and Riki Ott’s ​Not One Drop: Betrayal and 
Courage in the Wake of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill​.   These books will provide the context of the 1
spill, as well as wide ranging information on the response to the spill, as well as its impacts on 
Alaskans and the United States as a whole. 
Though there was judicial and legislative action taken as a result of the ​Exxon Valdez​ oil 
spill, it was too narrow in scope to prevent future oil spills from happening and only prevented 
an exact repeat of the ​Exxon Valdez ​oil spill.  The spill fouled Alaskan waters and destroyed a 
way of life for many Alaskan people, as well as providing a very real wake up call to those not 
aware of just how much oil was being pumped, transported, and used.  
A study by researchers from Northwestern University and University of Wisconsin, 
Madison found that the nonstop media coverage that typically follows disasters such as the 
Exxon Valdez ​spill serve only to calm fears about the impact of the spill and do not catalyze 
action to create change.  Writing about the ​Exxon Valdez​ and ​Deepwater Horizon ​oil spills, 
authors Ashlee Humpreys and Craig Thompson wrote that ​“We found that the national news 
1 Daniel Yergin, ​The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power ​(New York: Free Press, 
2008); ​John Keeble, ​Out of the Channel: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Sound 
(John Keeble: 1991); Angela Day, ​Red Light to Starboard: Recalling the Exxon Valdez Disaster 
(Pullman: Washington State University Press, 2014); Art Davidson, ​In the Wake of the Exxon 
Valdez: The Devastating Impact of the Alaska Oil Spill​ (New York: Random House Publishing, 
1990); Stan Jones, ​The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster​ (Kenmore: 
Epicenter Press, 2009)​; Riki Ott, ​Not One Drop: Betrayal and Courage in the Wake of the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill ​(White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing: 2008) 
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media coverage of these two events helped to resolve many of the cultural anxieties that resulted, 
explaining what many environmental activists have labeled ‘oil spill amnesia.’”   In a summary 2
of the study, Mary-Ann Twist wrote that: 
The authors identified four distinct narratives in the news coverage that create 
what they term the disaster myth, or the act of directing consumer attention 
toward the company responsible for the disaster, and then providing a dramatic 
closure to the crisis. The narratives include: segregation (separating oil from 
nature), exception (the disaster was unforeseeable), punishment (how the 
responsible company is penalized), and restoration (describing how the damage 
will be undone).  3
 
This exact phenomenon occurred after the ​Exxon Valdez​ oil spill, with the spill hitting the 
front page of the New York Times as soon as possible after the spill.   Even though the 4
spill happened at nearly three o’clock AM Eastern Time on March 25, the New York 
Times managed to run a story on the spill in its late edition that same day.  Much ado was 
made about the removal of oil, from Saturday Night Live skits to Congressional hearings. 
The crash on Bligh Reef was framed as unavoidable, caused by America’s obsession with 
finding and utilizing as much oil as possible.  The captain, Joseph Hazelwood, and his 
company, ExxonMobil, were brought to court in both criminal and civil cases.  Finally, 
Congressional hearings were held and news laws were demanded in response to the spill, 
fulfilling all four tenets of oil spill response that Humpreys and Thompson concluded do 
not lead to meaningful change. 
2 Ashlee Humphreys and Craig J. Thompson. “Branding Disaster: Reestablishing Trust through 
the Ideological Containment of Systemic Risk Anxieties.” ​Journal of Consumer Research 
3 Mary-Ann Twist. “Exxon Valdez 2014: Does Media Coverage of Manmade Disasters 
Contribute to Consumer Complacency?” ​The University of Chicago Press 
4 “Largest U.S. Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels of Oil Off Alaska,” ​New York Times​, 
138:47,820, (March 25, 1989) sec. A, 1 
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The response to the spill was a mixed bag, above average in some regards, such as the 
immediate response from ExxonMobil, and subpar in terms of communications and effective 
containment of the spill.  ExxonMobil had been lauded in the weeks before the ​Exxon Valdez 
spill for their response to the ​Exxon Houston​, which spilled oil off the coast of Hawaii and 
dumped hundreds of thousands of gallons into the Pacific, threatening the coast of Oahu.  This 
spill paled in comparison to the ​Valdez​.  Frank Iarossi, the president of the Exxon Shipping 
Corporation was on his way to Alaska within hours of the spill and flew directly over the spill 
where he learned that in the first twelve hours since running aground the ​Valdez​ had spilled two 
hundred and fifty times more oil than had been spilled in Hawaii.  Iarossi was a graduate of the 
Coast Guard Academy and had served for a decade and received master’s degrees in naval 
architecture and mechanical engineering in that time.  Under Iarossi’s watch no major spills had 
occurred and Exxon’s eighteen tugs and nineteen tankers had mostly performed as desired. 
Within days, ExxonMobil had accepted responsibility for the spill and promised to 
facilitate the cleanup.  The New York Times reported that despite Exxon’s promise to accept full 
financial responsibility, Congress had previously established a fund to pay for damages from oil 
spills.  The Trans-Alaska Authorization Act of 1973 permitted the construction of the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline and established how any oil spills were to be paid for.  Through a 5 cents 
per barrel fee on oil producers, Congress had created a fund to pay for $86 million worth of 
damages after the contribution of $14 million from the responsible party.  The Trans-Alaska 
Authorization Act of 1973 also limited oil shippers’ responsibility to only $100 million.  5
5 “Exxon May Have Small Liability for Spill Claims.,” ​New York Times​, 138:47,823, (March 28, 
1989) sec. B, 7 
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Blame for the ​Exxon Valdez ​spill was quickly assigned to Captain Joseph Hazelwood. 
Hazelwood had not been on deck at the time of the crash, and was reportedly drinking heavily, 
even though the ​Valdez​ was officially a dry ship.  Just four days after the spill, the New York 
Times ran an article entitled “Captain Has History of Drinking and Driving.”   Hazelwood was 6
asleep in his bunk when the tanker ran aground on the Bligh Reef, despite the official Exxon 
manual stating that the captain must be on duty and on the bridge “whenever conditions present a 
potential threat to the vessel such as a passing in the vicinity of shoals, rocks, or other hazards 
presenting any threat to safe navigation” .  The last communication before the spill was when 7
Hazelwood requested permission from the Coast Guard to change lanes.  The Coast Guard 
officer on duty allowed it and then vacated his desk and chatted with the officer set to relieve 
him at midnight.  It was not until after the crash that Hazelwood, possibly slurring his words, 
radioed the Coast Guard and let them know exactly what had happened. 
Despite the widely circulated rumors of Hazelwood’s inebriation, there was no concrete 
evidence of him being too drunk to operate the ship.  A test ten hours after the grounding placed 
him at a blood alcohol content of 0.061 percent, slightly more than half of Alaska’s drunk 
driving limit of 0.1 percent.  The Coast Guard had a limit of a 0.04 percent blood alcohol 
content, which Hazelwood’s purported 0.061 percent blood alcohol content exceeded.  A 
toxicologist at Hazelwood’s eventual trial used a hotly contested method of retrograde 
extrapolation to posit that his blood alcohol content at the time of the grounding was 0.22 
percent.  This is seemingly implausible however, since a blood alcohol content that high 
6 ​“Captain Has History of Drinking and Driving.,” ​New York Times ​, 138:47,823, (March 28, 
1989) sec. B, 7 
7 ​Day, Angela. ​Red Light to Starboard: Recalling the Exxon Valdez Disaster​. (Pullman: 
Washington State University Press, 2014), 14 
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typically kills the drinker.  Hazelwood admitted to drinking two Moussy beers, a very low 
alcohol beer that was permitted on the ​Exxon Valdez​.  Two Moussy beers could not have 
produced a blood alcohol content of 0.061 percent, leaving exactly how intoxicated Hazelwood 
was up in the air permanently.  The Coast Guard officer in charge of searching Hazelwood’s 
quarters admitted it was brief and less than thorough.  Hazelwood received some praise for his 
maneuvering of the ​Valdez​ after the grounding. 
This was not Hazelwood’s first incident involving drinking and the law.  He had been 
arrested in 1984 for drunk driving on Long Island and subsequently enrolled in a rehabilitation 
program.  Court records show that before his arrest for drunk driving he was questioned by 
police officers at his home where he “had a strong odor of alcoholic beverage on his breath, he 
was unsteady of his feet, and his speech was slurred.”   Exxon handled Hazelwood’s arrest 8
internally, suspending him for 90 days.  Exxon records show that Hazelwood was an episodic 
and excessive drinker, resulting in “familial and vocational dysfunction”  including pushing his 9
two decade long marriage to the brink of divorce.  Though sailors are not typically known as the 
most well behaved bunch, Hazelwood earned a reputation as the most rowdy of them, drinking 
heavily since his high school days and having little sense of when to stop. 
Hazelwood and the entire cleanup of the spill were skewered by the public.  Just three 
weeks after the spill, Saturday Night Live’s cold open satirized the cleanup efforts.  A cleanup 
worker on the beach asks his supervisor “where do we put the otters,” to which his supervisor 
responds, “You know the procedure…  There are four otter piles: oily dead otters, clean dead 
8 “Captain” 
9 ​Keeble, John. ​Out of the Channel: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Sound​. (John 
Keeble, 1991), 35 
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otters, oily live otters, and clean live otters.  Got it?”  Later in the sketch, the supervisor looks 
down at a patch of clean sand with oily footprints in it and exclaims, “Alright, who tracked oil 
through our clean patch?”  A man in black behind the supervisor sheepishly raises his hand, and 
the other cleanup workers all rat him out, declaring “Hazelwood!”  The supervisor continues, 
“Captain Hazelwood, you’re on pretty thin ice already,” eliciting a hearty laugh from the crowd. 
Saturday Night Live’s version of Captain Hazelwood explains, “Gosh I’m sorry sir, guess I did it 
again!” before taking a prolonged swig from a flask and announcing, “Live from New York, it’s 
Saturday Night!”   Months after the spill, Captain Hazelwood was on a flight from Anchorage to 10
Seattle when he was heckled by passengers who took videos and pictures of him, and he was 
called “a real jerk” by one passenger.  11
Alaska was destined to become an oil haven.  Throughout the 20th century oil had turned 
the wheels of world progress and domination, with Exxon being an offshoot of the notorious 
Rockefeller Standard Oil Trust.  The 1928 Redline Agreement distributed the dissolving 
Ottoman Empire’s oil holdings amongst European countries and America.  America’s conquest 
for oil continued with the Suez War and was briefly pushed back by the formation of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which sought to turn the world order on its head 
and give economic power to oil rich countries such as Angola, Mexico, and various Middle 
Eastern states.  As the Middle East became more volatile, oil companies could no longer straddle 
the line of national loyalties and thus began offshore exploration throughout the globe.  When oil 
10 ​“Oil Spill Cold Opening.” ​NBC ​, Saturday Night Live, 15 Apr. 1989. 
11 ​“​Exxon Spill Captain is Heckled Aboard Plane​” ​New York Times ​, 138:47,902, (June 15, 1989) 
sec. A, 27 
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popped up in the frigid North Slope, Alaska’s fate was sealed as an oil first, everything else 
second state. 
Governor Steve Cowper knew this.  Alaska’s government was eighty five percent funded 
by royalties from the oil industry.  Alaskans paid no sales tax, no income tax, and were paid out 
annually from a “permanent fund” solely for living in the state.  Cowper consulted with Dan 
Lawn, an environmental engineer who worked on the design and construction of the Valdez 
Marine Terminal before joining the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation to work 
as a regulator.  Lawn told Cowper that oil companies had not fulfilled their side of the deal with 
the State of Alaska and that state authorities had been too timid to shut down the pipeline or level 
sanctions if oil companies did not comply.  Theoretically, Lawn had a point, but in practice that 
was suicide for anyone at the state office that wanted a political future. 
Cowper was forced to do damage control, and in a press conference at the Valdez Civic 
Center stated that: 
We don’t want anybody to think they have to hire a lawyer and go into federal 
court and sue the largest corporation in America.  We want to put a system 
together that will allow you who are suffering damages—the fishermen and other 
people in this are—to bring to us a fairly simple set of proof of whatever you lose 
and we want you to be paid quickly and expeditiously.  12
 
That promise fell short, as many fishermen never received a penny of compensation after the 
spill. 
Prince William Sound is just east of Anchorage, a body of water full of narrow channels 
and straits created by the many rocky islands throughout its waters.  In 1962, a massive 9.2 
magnitude earthquake shook the Sound, destroying towns such as Valdez and Chenega.  These 
12 Day, 71. 
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towns were later rebuilt at higher, safer elevations.  The many islands of the Sound are irregular 
and their coastlines jut in and out, with cliffs, rocky beaches, and coarse sand taking turns as the 
coastline.  Knight Island’s rocky, jagged coastline has been carved by the rapid tides of the 
Sound and at one point in the middle of the island is less than a mile wide.  Just a mile south of 
the point Knight Island is nearly nine miles across.  The cold, clear waters of Prince William 
Sound lend themselves well to the abundance of life that proliferates in its waters and islands. 
Beneath the surface live various crustaceans, mollusks, fish, and aquatic mammals.  Orcas and 
porpoises play in the deeper waters and dozens of animals live on the shore, including bears, 
wolverines, and sea and river otters.  Massive glaciers calve and drop icebergs into the water, 
creating thunderous noise.  On the night of the spill, reports of ice floating into the shipping 
channels delayed the ​Valdez ​by an hour.  All of these plants, animals, natural areas were soon to 
be coated by the thick, black oil silently sliding through the water. 
The animals that live in the water and on the islands of Prince William Sound were 
devastated by the oil spill.  Richard Newman, whose work documenting the oil spill earned a 
spot in the White House’s photo archives, described seeing a blacktailed deer trapped in the oil 
and a sea otter with its eyes scratched out, saying, “It tore up its own face.  It scratched out its 
eyes because of the hydrocarbons.  It died with its paws folded on its chest, where they stopped 
from the scratching.  Another otter had chewed off a paw.  There was a starfish, still alive, but 
half-eaten through by the crude.”   Just days after the spill 16,000 dead birds had been recovered 13
in addition to 700 otters,  plus thousands of other animals spotted dead on the beaches 14
throughout the Sound.  It quickly became obvious that an accurate and complete count of the 
13 Keeble, 74 
14 Keeble, 167 
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dead animals was impossible, as some animals sank and many aquatic animals died underwater, 
never to resurface.  Dead animals floating in the oil slick were often imperceptible and appeared 
to just be a small, dark, round bump in the oil. 
In the days after the grounding of the ​Valdez​, two priorities came to the forefront.  First, 
lightering, which is the removal of the oil still in the tanks, needed to occur.  Second was 
cleaning up and containing the spill.  Lightering was clearly the responsibility of Exxon and less 
than two weeks after the grounding Iarossi ordered the ​Valdez ​to be towed off of Bligh Reef and 
to Outside Bay, southwest of the reef and by Naked Island.  The technical challenges were 
handled remarkably well by Exxon, as they were able to repair the ship and divert the ​Exxon 
Baton Rouge​ to come from the Port of Valdez.  The lightering operation came to use two tankers 
and four tugs but was successful in removing the oil from the ​Valdez ​and avoiding capsizing the 
ship as its distribution of weight shifted and changed. 
How to clean the spill and who should clean it was a much trickier problem.  Four days 
after the grounding the oil occupied eighteen square miles and the four entities involved–the 
Coast Guard, state of Alaska, Alyeska, and Exxon–all disagreed on who should be responsible 
for the cleanup.  The Alaskan government believed Alyeska was responsible for immediate 
action, as the state believed that Alyeska’s plan promised a response within two to five hours and 
the ultimate removal of fifty percent of the spilled oil.  This, of course, did not happen as 
Alyeska took over fifteen hours to arrive on the scene, and when they did they were inadequately 
prepared.  Alyeska’s spill containment equipment had been shoved into corners of storage 
facilities and buried under snow and in the first day following the spill no booms were on site.  A 
palty two skimmers were in operation, but those skimmers had nowhere to offload the oil they 
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collected.  In the following, days Alyeska was similarly useless and ignored offers of help from 
fishermen in nearby Alaskan villages.  Alyeska’s plan was to remove 100,000 barrels of oil from 
the Sound by the third day.  They had barely recovered three percent of that.  Furthermore, their 
goal of removing fifty percent was completely unreasonable, four to five times as much as the 
industry standard from other large spills and double the maximum under ideal conditions posited 
by experts.  Iarossi believed that Alyeska’s ability to handle the spill was suspect and had 
arranged for the slick to be sprayed with dispersant.  This plan ran into countless issues, 
including the fact that Iarossi did not have permission to spray as well as the fact that there was 
not enough dispersant or planes in Alaska to undertake Iarossi’s plan. 
Dispersants were a quick, Band-Aid type fix to oil spills.  Basically, dispersants break up 
the cohesiveness of the oil, breaking it into small droplets instead of the nasty slicks.  These 
droplets then have an increased surface area, allowing the process of decomposition and bacterial 
consumption to occur faster than sans dispersant.  These droplets then sink in the water, and 
therein lies the main attraction.  Dispersants do not clean the water in the way that booms and 
skimmers do, but they make the surface look cleaner, and Exxon’s public relations suffered 
massively due to the pictures of animals coated in oil and the shiny black oil sitting on top of the 
water. 
In the weeks and months that followed, the federal government drummed up responses 
and reactions to the spill.  At the Department of Fish and Wildlife, an otter population study was 
wounded by the spill as the department struggled through bureaucratic bottlenecks to survey the 
otters of the Sound, as Prince William Sound was home to the most genetic diversity of otters 
anywhere in the world.  Also halted, at least for the time being, was legislation with plans to 
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allow limited oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.  It had passed committee in the 
Senate and was expected to be supported by Congress.  President George Herbert Walker Bush 
continued to support and advocate for the bill, but few in Congress were now willing to stick 
their neck out.  The United States government passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in response 
to the spill.  The act sought to avoid more oil spills by creating parameters for timely removal of 
oil and assigning liability for the cost of cleanup and damages.  As a result of the Oil Pollution 
Act, mariners were required to have a “Certificate of Financial Responsibility” which ensured 
they were able and willing to pay for any costs incurred in the case of an oil spill.  Also required 
was for companies to ship oil in double hulled ships, though many companies, including Exxon 
and Texaco, put off the implementation of double hulled ships.  The Oil Pollution Act also led to 
the withdrawal of several proposals for increased oil exploration throughout American lands and 
waters. 
In Alaska, Governor Cowper made small changes.  He required that two tugboats escort 
every tanker through Prince William Sound from Valdez.  In the 1990s the tugboats were 
replaced with a single Escort Response Vehicle, responsible for monitoring and escorting the 
tankers on their journey through the Sound. 
Economically the spill had wide ranging impacts.  The Chugach Alaska Corporation, one 
of thirteen Alaska Native Corporations created by Congress to administer Alaskan lands, filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after a massive die off of clams, herrings, and seals, through the 
corporation eventually recovered.  Recreational sport fishing, commercial fishing, and tourism 
all took hits.  Furthermore, many people involved in the cleanup reportedly suffered chronic 
illnesses as a result of their constant exposure to oil and its fumes.  An Anchorage lawyer found 
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these claims to be mostly true, though Exxon countered that “there is no evidence suggesting that 
either cleanup workers or the residents of the communities affected by the Valdez spill have had 
any adverse health effects as a result of the spill or its cleanup.”  15
The spill triggered a litany of lawsuits against ExxonMobil, some of which lasted into the 
21st century.  In 2008, the Alaska Supreme Court’s final ruling on punitive damages in the wake 
of the spill was that ExxonMobil had to pay $500 million to the thousands of fishermen and 
others involved in the class action suit.  An original ruling by a lower court had granted $2.5 
billion dollars, but the Supreme Court overturned that.  The Supreme Court’s ruling granted 
approximately $15,000 to those in the class action suit, which lawyer David Frederick referred to 
as “a pittance.”   The court cases were endlessly complex.  In the case of ​Chenega Corp. v. 16
Exxon Corp. ​Justice Bryner wrote that a lower court had awarded various native Alaskan 
corporations almost $6 million dollars.  This had been prompted by the corporations filing suit 
after the spill, claiming damage to their real estate as well as intangibles such as archaeological 
sites and artifacts.  The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 granted Alaskan native corporations the right 
to seek reparations for damages caused by the spill on land that the tribes claimed but had not 
been granted to them by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.  The corporations in the 
meantime received payments from the Trans–Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund and a settlement 
with Alyeska, resulting in the jury deciding that Exxon need not pay the corporations, resulting 
in the corporations appealing.  The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling, resulting that Exxon did 
not owe the Chenega Corporation any money after the case.   17
15 “Critics call Valdez cleanup a warning for Gulf workers,” ​CNN​, (July 8, 2010) 
16 Langfitt, Frank, “Supreme Court Cuts Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Damages.” National Public 
Radio, (June 2008) 
17 Chenega Corp. v. Exxon Corp., Supreme Court of Alaska. (November 22, 1999) 
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Court cases did not just involve the physical damages of the spill.  In the case of ​Kodiak 
Island Borough v. Exxon Corp.​, the Kodiak Island Borough, with the City of Seward, City of 
Cordova, City of Old Harbor, City of Ouzinkie, City of Port Lions, and the City of Larsen Bay 
sued Exxon for costs related to the municipal services that had been diverted during the 
management of the spill.  Exxon had used many public buildings as centers for the cleanup 
efforts and extra police, fire, and medical personnel were required.  In the State of Alaska’s penal 
code, AS 46.03.822(a) established that the owner of a hazardous substance that is accidentally 
released is responsible for the containment costs incurred by any cities that handle the efforts.  A 
lower court had found that Exxon was not liable for those costs, and the Alaska Supreme Court 
reversed the ruling, assigning complete responsibility to Exxon.  18
The public was outraged by the oil spill, especially those closest to it.  Captain Joseph 
Hazelwood’s trial was held in Anchorage, despite his defense’s claims that it was impossible to 
have a fair and impartial jury there.  Said Anchorage Superior Court Judge Karl Johnstone, “If 
Oliver North can get a fair trial, I’m sure Captain Hazelwood can get a fair trial, too,” proving 
that even a judge was not immune to bias as he compared Hazelwood to a man who aided in the 
sale of weapons to Iran during the Reagan administration.   The prosecutors had agreed earlier 19
that it was unreasonable to hold the trial in Valdez, and the defense had lobbied to hold the trial 
in Fairbanks, in Interior Alaska.  During the trial, Hazelwood’s sobriety onboard the ​Exxon 
Valdez ​was yet again called into question.  The tanker’s pilot, William Murphy, testified that 
Hazelwood was not impaired in any way.  Murphy also testified that “the captain’s speech had 
18 Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., Supreme Court of Alaska. (November 22, 1999) 
19 “Exxon Valdez Trial to Be Held in Anchorage.” ​New York Times​, 139:48,038 (October 29, 
1989) sec. L, 27 
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not been slurred,” and “responded negatively when asked if the captain’s movements had 
changed, if his eyes had been watery and if he had undergone a mood change from that 
afternoon.”   Hazelwood was later cleared of the felony charge against him, second-degree 20
criminal mischief, as well as operating a vessel while intoxicated and reckless endangerment, 
both misdemeanors.  He was convicted of a misdemeanor charge of negligent discharge of oil. 
Despite earlier worries of an unfair trial, Hazelwood had no such issues, as one juror, Jeff Sage, 
shook his hand after the trial and told him “I’m glad to see justice was done, Mr. Hazelwood.”  21
He was sentenced to 1,000 hours of community service and fined $50,000. 
The United States government was also very invested in the oil spill, as it pitted the 
country’s capitalistic ideals against its appreciation and protection of natural beauty.  The House 
of Representatives held a hearing on the effect of the oil spill on Prince William Sound.   The 22
hearing included testimony from many powerful and knowledgeable people, including the 
Secretary of Commerce, the Regional Forester of the United States Department of Agriculture, a 
representative from the Department of the Interior, the President of the Alyeska Pipeline Service 
Company, and many others.  Alaska’s sole representative in the House of Representatives, Don 
Young, testified before the committee.  He stated that money should be invested to help Alaskan 
communities recover from the oil spill and also to manage other tanks of oil that sat in Alaska 
and were liable to spill into the Sound.  However, in his prepared statement Representative 
20 “​Tanker's Captain Seemed Sober, Pilot Tells Court​” ​New York Times​, 139:48,183, (February 7, 
1990) sec. A, 17 
21 “Ship Captain Acquitted of Felony But Is Convicted on Minor Charge.,” ​New York Times​, 
139:48,183, (March 23, 1990) sec. A, 1&14 
22 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, ​The Ecological 
Changes in Prince William Sound after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and the Use of Fines 
Imposed: Hearing before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries​. 103rd Cong., 1st 
Sess., (March 24, 1993)  
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Young downplayed the effects of the spill, saying that “not a single life was lost during the 
accident,” “the herring and salmon have returned,” and that “the otter population in my State is 
as large as ever.”  23
Representative Young complimented the chairman of the Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries on having a bipartisan committee,  yet partisanship revealed itself in the 24
statement of Representative Elizabeth Furse of Oregon.  While Representative Young, a 
Republican, had stated that the populations of Alaskan animals had been restored to their 
pre-spill numbers in just four years, Representative Furse, a Democrat, said that she was 
“interested in learning how funds are being spent to restore each of the various damaged 
resources, including marine mammals, fish, and seabirds.”   Curt Weldon, a representative from 25
Pennsylvania, had close knowledge of the oil spill, as he had visited the site shortly after the spill 
occured.  He stated in a prepared statement that “while efforts have been made to improve 
response procedures in the event of another oil spill, one has to wonder if they are adequate 
enough.”  26
Admiral John William Kime, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, testified 
that enacting the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 represented a significant portion of the Coast Guard’s 
work in 1993.  He lauded the Oil Pollution Act for establishing the National Pollution Funds 
Center, which handled claims stemming from oil spills.  The National Pollution Funds Center 
also provided money up front to states so that they could get ahead of oil spills and not have to 
wait on funding before beginning clean up efforts.  He also announced that the Coast Guard had 
23 ​The Ecological Changes​, 16 
24 ​The Ecological Changes​, 15 
25 The Ecological Changes​, 16 
26 ​ The Ecological Changes​, 17 
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established an Atlantic “strike team” in order to be able to respond quickly to any oil spill, giving 
the Coast Guard a total of three “strike teams.”  The Coast Guard also established worldwide 
dates to phase out single hulled ships and replace them with double hulled ships, which were less 
susceptible to oil spills.  The Coast Guard also completed a Port-Needs Study on 23 different 
ports and appropriated funds during the 1993 Coast Guard Appropriations Subcommittee 
meetings, which were put to use renovating ports.  
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was in direct response to the ​Exxon Valdez ​oil spill and it 
was supported by nearly all of Congress, as it had passed the Senate 99-0.   The Oil Pollution 27
Act of 1990 strengthened the Environmental Protection Agency’s ability to respond to oil spills, 
in part by taxing oil to establish a fund that funded cleanups when the responsible party was not 
able to pay for it.  The Environmental Protection Agency also required detailed plans for their 
response to an oil spill in the event that one did occur.  The Environmental Protection Agency 
also published guidelines for the above ground storage of oil, while the Coast Guard published 
guidelines for the storage of oil in oil tankers.   One negative impact of the Oil Pollution Act of 28
1990 was that it disincentivized upgrading to higher quality ships for oil companies.  As owners 
were held completely liable for oil spills, it did not make financial sense to upgrade as double 
hulled ships cost much more to maintain and operate.  The scope of the act was fairly narrow, as 
it focused mainly on the ​Exxon Valdez​ without an eye to any other potential spills.  In fact, a 
large amount of the act was spent preventing a repeat of the ​Exxon Valdez ​spill, especially in 
Title V, “Prince William Sound Provisions.”  
27 ​“​16 Months After Valdez Spill, Oil Bill Nears Final Passage​” ​New York Times ​, 139:48,316, 
(August 3, 1990) sec. B, 6 
28 United States Congress. Senate and House of Representatives. ​Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
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Title V established that “The Secretary of Commerce shall provide for the establishment 
of a Prince William Sound Oil Spill Recovery Institute (hereinafter in this section referred to as 
the ‘‘Institute’’) through the Prince William Sound Science and Technology Institute located in 
Cordova, Alaska.”    The Institute was established in order identify and develop techniques to 29
handle the cleanup and containment of oil spills in arctic and subarctic climes, as well as to study 
the impact the ​Exxon Valdez​ oil spill had on Prince William Sound and surrounding 
communities.  Also provided for in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was the creation of the Oil 
Terminal and Oil Tanker Environmental Oversight and Monitoring Act of 1990, which was 
created to involve citizens in the oversight of oil tankers and terminals, as well as to assure the 
upkeep of those.  However, the Oil Terminal and Oil Tanker Environmental Oversight and 
Monitoring Act of 1990 granted little power, as Section 5002(b)(2) established that “the function 
of these Programs shall be advisory only” and was limited to just the State of Alaska.   30
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was very unpopular with oil companies, which President 
George H.W. Bush acknowledged when he signed it into law.  The oil industry complained that 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was an impediment to free trade in American water due to its 
restrictions on international trade, but also the imposition of liability statutes.  Some in the oil 
industry even threatened to boycott American ports if the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was 
implemented, but those threats turned out to be empty after President Bush signed it into law on 
August 18, 1990.  The enactment of the Oil Pollution Act led to a small drop in oil traffic into 
American ports, but nothing substantial.  One positive aspect of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
was that a consortium of oil shipping companies united to form the Marine Spill Response 
29 United States Congress. Senate and House of Representatives. ​Oil Pollution Act of 1990​, 45 
30 United States Congress. Senate and House of Representatives. ​Oil Pollution Act of 1990​, 49 
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Corporation, a corporation dedicated to designing response plans to oil spills, as well as planning 
the remediation that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 required after oil spills. 
There is no neat and tidy conclusion to the story of the ​Exxon Valdez​ oil spill where the 
Alaskans are showered with money by ExxonMobil and all the otters are lovingly scrubbed clean 
of oil.  Much of the oil remained in Prince William Sound, stuck underneath rocks, on beaches, 
and in countless other impossible to clean places.  Frank Iarossi resigned shortly after the spill 
and slunk off to a life of anonymity.  Captain Joseph Hazelwood returned to work after his trial 
ended, captaining boats very similar to the one he had allowed to crash in Prince William 
Sound’s blue waters.  Alaskans were forced to reckon with the damage of the spill on their own 
as lawsuits spent decades in court.  Many Alaskans were never compensated.  Out of the spill 
came cries for change that in large part were not answered adequately.  The United States 
government enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, a narrow bill that did little to deal with the 
United States’ obsessive need for oil.  Decades after the ​Exxon Valdez​ oil spill, the ​Deepwater 
Horizon​, an offshore drilling rig, spewed oil in the Gulf of Mexico, overtaking the ​Exxon Valdez 
as the worst oil spill in American history in terms of total barrels spilled.  Clearly, the response to 
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